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Aviso de seguridad
Malicious LiteLLM 1.107.0 artifacts require credential rotation and clean rebuilds. Newer releases use keyless cosign; earlier images retain key signatures, including compromised images signed with the old key.
Quiénes deben revisar: Teams that obtained affected PyPI or container artifacts, including cached copies executed after registry withdrawal.
Acción recomendadaRequiere acciones adicionales
Identify affected executions, replace accessible credentials and rebuild from a clean environment.
The definitive October 23 investigation traces the release compromise to an administrative key exposed in a public repository in May and never revoked. The attacker obtained an organization owner’s GitHub token from the Agent Platform on October 10. Stolen identities enabled malicious workflow changes and release approvals. This corrects the initial hypothesis about tokens taken from deployment logs.
Affected distributions include PyPI wheels and Docker Hub/GHCR images. The vendor excludes the official source tag and private enterprise registry. Distribution windows describe availability, not the last possible execution of cached copies.
Oktsec recommends preserving evidence, revoking reachable credentials and rebuilding from a clean environment. Do not start Python or pip in an affected environment: startup files can rerun the payload. A clean replacement does not invalidate stolen credentials.
LiteLLM’s November 15 update changes signature verification from v1.111.0-dev.3 onward: release images and Helm charts use keyless cosign, with a certificate identifying its GitHub release workflow and a Rekor transparency record. Verify the exact workflow identity and issuer listed in the vendor instructions. The command using a public key does not apply to these releases. This boundary does not recommend a development release for production.
Earlier images retain their key signatures. The replacement public-key SHA-256 fingerprint published after the October 23 rotation is e3fe3e08c44b16407fe0b37c43b4f8b603b3a0f4ee74c29e647bc022d762c2c0. Compromised v1.107.0 images also had valid signatures from the previous key. Check digest, publication history and signature provenance together; signature validity alone does not establish safety.
Proveedor / autor
LiteLLM
Divulgado
21 oct 2026
Última revisión de evidencia
15 nov 2026 UTC
¿Qué sistemas y versiones están afectados?
Producto
Afectado
Versión corregida / acción
PyPI wheels
litellm 1.107.0, published October 21 between 11:39:51 and 13:23 UTC
Rebuild using a verified clean release; initial vendor recovery guidance names 1.106.2
Docker Hub images
v1.107.0, latest, main-latest and main-stable: compromised artifacts served October 21, 11:46:56–14:20 UTC
Use a verified clean image digest
GHCR images
Affected tags of litellm, litellm-database and litellm-non_root: October 21, 11:46:56 UTC until removal by 13:51 UTC
Use a verified clean image digest
Usá las indicaciones para tu producto y rama. Confirmá con el proveedor las correcciones adaptadas a tu distribución; el nombre del producto por sí solo no establece exposición.
¿Qué evidencia respalda este aviso?
Evidencia del incidente
Ataques confirmados
Fundamento de la prioridad
A malicious package was distributed. If it executed, treat credentials accessible to that process as potentially exposed.
¿Qué implica para los entornos de IA?
Model provider keys and agent credentials stored in the same environment belong in the investigation.
Published. Malicious distribution confirmed by the vendor; customer impact requires investigation.
Added the response priority rationale and original disclosure date.
Clarified the vendor warning against running Python or pip in an affected environment, and included this incident in AI and cloud credential coverage.
Added the vendor’s definitive October 23 investigation, which corrects the initial access hypothesis; distinguished registry exposure windows and cached artifacts. Response priority remains Act now.
Edited earlier editorial notes for readers; original wording remains in version history.
Added the October 30 signing-key clarification: compromised images could pass old-key signature verification. Included the replacement public-key fingerprint and digest checks; credential rotation remains necessary.
Added the November 15 move to keyless cosign for release images and Helm charts, with workflow identity and issuer checks; retained separate verification for older signed images and incident recovery actions.
Acciones de respuesta
Prepará tu respuesta
0 de 4 acciones registradas como completadas
Usá esta lista para evaluar si el aviso afecta a tus sistemas, registrar las acciones de tu equipo y compartir el resultado. Radar no escanea ni verifica tu entorno.
Los cambios se guardan automáticamente en este navegador. No se sincronizan con tu equipo ni se envían a Oktsec.
Indicá el sistema y la persona o equipo responsable. Actualizá cada acción y agregá una referencia al ticket o notas sobre lo revisado.
1
Find where it ran
Check package records, image digests, cached artifacts and CI deployments against the vendor’s PyPI, Docker Hub and GHCR windows. Cached copies may execute after removal from a registry; record when and where the affected artifact ran.
Agregar evidencia o notasUsá solo referencias. No guardes credenciales ni datos confidenciales acá.
2
Replace reachable credentials
Revoke and replace credentials reachable from an affected environment, including model provider keys, IAM credentials, database passwords and proxy keys. Review their use from outside your infrastructure and preserve relevant audit records.
Agregar evidencia o notasUsá solo referencias. No guardes credenciales ni datos confidenciales acá.
3
Rebuild from a clean environment
Preserve evidence and rebuild from a clean environment. Do not start Python or pip in an affected environment: startup files can rerun the payload. Verify the replacement digest and use the signature method documented for its release; a valid signature alone does not exclude compromised images.
Agregar evidencia o notasUsá solo referencias. No guardes credenciales ni datos confidenciales acá.
4
Use the verification method for the selected release
From v1.111.0-dev.3, LiteLLM documents keyless cosign for release images and Helm charts. Match the exact certificate identity and GitHub OIDC issuer in the vendor’s verification instructions; do not accept an arbitrary signer. Earlier releases still require the appropriate public key. This signing boundary is not a recommendation to deploy a development release or proof of host cleanup.
Agregar evidencia o notasUsá solo referencias. No guardes credenciales ni datos confidenciales acá.
3. Compartí el plan
Descargá un archivo Markdown con tu decisión, los estados de las acciones, las notas y las fuentes. Compartilo con tu equipo o adjuntalo a un ticket.
Solo se revisaron las versiones de paquetes enumeradas. Tu entorno no fue escaneado. OSV y el registro de OpenSSF enlazado representan el mismo informe.
Fuentes
Los datos técnicos provienen de estas fuentes. Las prioridades y las acciones recomendadas son el análisis de Oktsec.