NCSC Annual Review 2026: lessons for AI agent security
What the UK’s incident evidence and defensive AI plans mean for agent permissions, tool access, patching and verifiable controls.
Research
We investigate how agent systems fail, reproduce the attack paths and turn the findings into controls teams can use.
60 publications51 research9 incident analysesUpdated Nov 5, 2026RSS
Research, practical guides and incident analyses.
What the UK’s incident evidence and defensive AI plans mean for agent permissions, tool access, patching and verifiable controls.
WEF’s risk outlook, October’s agent tooling incidents, and the permissions, deployment tests and evidence teams should review now.
Ten proposed identity principles, the controls to test on a real tool call, and an implementation mapping of Oktsec with its deployment requirements and gaps.
A technical review of the reported campaign, with checks for SAML validation, cloud roles, directory delegation, credential revocation and endpoint visibility.
CrowdStrike reports at least 15 healthcare entities compromised and medical records stolen from at least one. We examine the attack workflow, two documented episodes and the controls teams should verify.
Critical PHP, GitLab and VeloCloud updates. LiteLLM, Railway and TiDB Cloud credential response. The eMudhra deadline, data disclosures and AI-assisted campaigns.
AWS traces PHP2Shell attempts to October 17. Updated patch guidance, investigation checks and WAF limits, alongside Node.js fixes and the eMudhra certificate response.
Seven steps to keep operating and recover from a disruptive cyber attack. With an interactive diagnosis, recovery flows, an AI agent containment runbook and tabletop exercises.
ISO/IEC 27090:2026 covers AI threats and extends zero trust to agent operations. What the guidance contains, how it fits with 27001 and 42001, and what to check in your systems.
Unit 42 found conversational comments in scripts used against government Linux servers. What the evidence says about AI assistance, how the attack worked and what defenders can check.
AI-generated messages achieved a 54% click rate in one study, matching human experts. What cheaper personalization means for employee training, payment controls and AI assistants.
An OpenAI research model completed a deployment using a wallet the task never supplied. What this case teaches teams about accounts, credentials and deployment permissions.
A verified identity and a company laptop do not always identify the person doing the work. Microsoft’s findings on AI personas, the FBI’s alert and practical checks for hiring, access and offboarding.
CISA and four US agencies warn of attacks on refrigeration and cold chain monitoring. What is known, how far exposure extends and eight controls to verify with operations.
Six security disclosures from 2026 show what exposed credentials and missing permissions can allow. Five checks to run before someone builds a different client for your API.
An old server, a stolen password or an overprivileged app can put company email within reach. Lessons from the FBI, CISA and NSA advisory, with a practical plan for startups and security teams.
MITRE’s AI Mission Testing Gap applied to enterprise agents: a supplier-payment example, six security tests and evidence for deciding when a pilot is ready.
Practical examples for founders and small teams: customer refunds, supplier invoices and sales data. Decide what AI can do, test the limits and prepare for mistakes.
Ten risks in the skills your agents load, with practical examples, an approval workflow and eight tests for permissions, scanning, updates and recovery.
A practical guide for startups and security teams: inventory agent tools, limit access, monitor changes and verify fixes. With examples drawn from an incident-response workflow.
Follow a billing API patch from code review to tool permissions and dependency monitoring. What to check, what evidence to keep, and where Oktsec fits.
The harness connects a model to tools, data and systems. We explain ASD’s guidance through one engineering task: what the agent can do, where permissions apply and how to verify the result.
The proposal, the responses from Altman and Musk, and the security checks companies can make before giving agents more access.
An agent can solve a problem and still exceed its assignment. What OpenAI’s enterprise security guide means for tool permissions, approvals and evidence.
OpenAI’s Defense Factory connects findings to verified fixes. The agents doing that work need scoped access and evidence that follows the patch into production.
Anthropic’s September 2026 threat report maps how AI supports an attack from stolen credentials to data theft. We examine the lifecycle, four observed workflows and the checks defenders can apply.
METR asks how to investigate the behavior behind AI incidents. Oktsec examines the deployment evidence: what ran, which permissions applied and where the record ends.
An AI agent can stay focused on its task and still act outside its authority. What Anthropic’s latest assessment means for permissions, monitoring and deployment tests.
What the NSA, CISA and FBI advisory means for model providers, and what agent teams should test about identity, approved destinations and fallback routes.
Five incident and test reports, plus Microsoft guidance: distinct failure paths, controls that held and practical tests for agent deployments.
A review of agent governance surveys, telemetry and guidance, with sample sizes, source limitations and practical control questions.
What advisory AA26-231A reports about AI-assisted industrial attack tooling, and which access and execution controls defenders should review.
AISI’s cyber evaluation shows why internet access, tool permissions and task scope need to be tested together. What the report establishes and what it does not.
The shipped 2026-07-28 specification removes protocol sessions and makes requests easier to scale. It also leaves state integrity, authorization and resource controls squarely in each implementation.
How OpenAI evaluation agents reached Hugging Face production, what METR’s later investigation changed, and what deployment teams can learn from the incident.
Sysdig documented what it assesses as the first agentic ransomware operation. The exploit chain was familiar; the adaptive loop and compressed response window were not.
Approval, supervision, bounded autonomy and recovery impose different controls. A framework for assigning authority to each consequential action.
Seven CVEs illustrate distinct failures in configuration loading, path handling and client/server trust, with links to vendor advisories.
AgentDojo, InjecAgent, ASB, MCPSecBench, MSB and MCPTox measure different attack classes, so their scores are not directly comparable.
A dated review of agent defenses, benchmark results and threat models. What PromptArmor, CommandSans, CaMeL and authorization studies do and do not establish.
What public repository scans, internet exposure studies and attack benchmarks establish about MCP risk, with their sampling limits.
How to instrument the authorization decision on every agent tool call and export identity, tool, arguments and policy verdict through OpenTelemetry.
A practical MCP security guide: authenticate callers, limit tool capabilities, inspect untrusted content, isolate execution and preserve useful audit records.
Read SKILL.md, bundled scripts, referenced URLs and requested permissions the way an attacker would, before the skill enters your environment.
Detection can identify and block threats. Authorization checks permissions. How to combine both with isolation and reliable evidence.
Signed Agent Cards, MCP enterprise managed authorization and task scoped token research: what each contributes to agent identity and what deployments still need to enforce.
MCP is moving authorization context from the connection to each request. The direction is clear; security still depends on how every server implements identity and policy.
SEP-2640 proposes distributing skills through MCP. How manifests, provenance and host approval work, and where the deployment still needs enforceable permissions.
The agent supply chain is every artifact an agent pulls into your environment: packages, MCP servers, skills and the trust behind them.
What agent records establish about identity, permissions and outcomes, and how to verify their integrity without overlooking gaps in coverage.
A scoped review of signed Agent Cards, enterprise-managed access, task authorization research and the integration work needed for runtime attribution.
A practical, audit grounded map of tool surfaces, credentials, network reach and the trust boundaries that decide your real attack surface.
How content inspection, explicit permissions and isolation address different parts of prompt injection risk in tool-using agents.
Five boundaries to review before and after connecting an MCP server: tool descriptions, permissions, authentication, dependencies and runtime changes.
How runtime policy checks identity, tools, parameters and destinations, alongside scanning, isolation and audit records.
The poisoned packages are gone. The credential risk can persist. What later FBI and CloudSEK reporting, release changes and MCP fixes mean for agent deployments.
The most consequential call a technical founder makes is what not to ship. Agent security cannot wait for an incident before becoming part of the product surface.
What zero trust means for AI agents, and how the framework maps to authorization, signed policy and verified evidence in practice.
How workload identity, delegated authority and per-tool records help attribute agent actions, with a review of available standards.
A practical review model for public agent tooling: permissions, provenance, install paths, version pinning and change over time.